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Abstract
We consider Salim Rashid’s asymptotic version of David Schmei-
dler’s theorem on the purification of Nash equilibria. We show that,
in contrast to what is stated, players’ payoff functions have to be se-
lected from an equicontinuous family in order for Rashid’s theorem to
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hold. That is, a bound on the diversity of payoffs is needed in order
for such asymptotic result to be valid.
Keywords : Nash Equilibrium; Purification; Asymptotic Results; Equicon-
tinuity.
JEL classification: C72.
1 Introduction
A special class of games are those in which each player payoff depends only
his choice and on the average choice of the others. This class of games is
interesting because all Nash equilibria of any such game can be purified,
whenever the set of players is described by a non-atomic measure space (see
Schmeidler [6]). Salim Rashid [5] stated an asymptotic version of Schmei-
dler’s theorem, according to which all Nash equilibria of sufficiently large
games of the same class can be approximately purified. Asymptotic results
are important because, after all, real-world games have finitely many players.
The goal of this note is to correct the statement of Rashid’s theorem.
We will show by an example that, as stated in his paper, the theorem is
incorrect. In our example, the crucial feature is that we use payoff functions
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belonging to a family that is not equicontinuous. In fact, we show that
Rashid’s theorem holds once an equicontinuity assumption is added. This
result stresses the importance of equicontinuity assumptions for asymptotic
results on Nash equilibria.1
2 Approximate Purification of Nash Equilib-
ria
In the class of normal-form games we consider, all players have the same
strategy space: the unit simplex sm on Rm, m > 1. Since the focus is on a
property that depends on the number of players, we will index any game by
the number of its players. Thus, Gn is a normal-form game in which the set
of player is {1, . . . , n}, and each has sm as her choice set. To each player t,
we associate m continuous functions Vtk : sm → R, 1 ≤ k ≤ m; then player
t’s payoff function is
Ut(x1, . . . , xn) = xt1Vt1
(∑
j 6=t
xj
n
)
+ . . .+ xtmVtm
(∑
j 6=t
xj
n
)
, (1)
1See Cartwright and Wooders [1], Hildenbrand [2] and Pa´scoa [4] among others for
related results that also require equicontinuity assumptions.
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for all (x1, . . . , xn). Thus, Gn is described by the vector (Vtk)t,k. Also, if U
denotes the space of all continuous, real-valued functions on sm, then a game
can be thought of as a subset of U . For any subset K of U , we write Gn ⊆ K
whenever Vtk ∈ K for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n and 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
For any ε ≥ 0, we say that x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x∗n) is an ε−equilibrium of a
game Gn if, for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Ut(x
∗) ≥ Ut(xt, x∗−t)− ε for all xt ∈ sm. (2)
Thus, in an ε−equilibrium, all players are close to their optimum by choos-
ing according to x∗. A strategy x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of Gn if x∗ is an
ε−equilibrium of Gn for ε = 0.
Let K be a subset of U . We say that K is equicontinuous (or, that the
family K of functions is equicontinuous) if for all η > 0 there exists a δ > 0
such that
|V (x)− V (y)| < η
whenever ||x − y|| < δ, x, y ∈ sm and V ∈ K (see Rudin [7, p. 156]). In
our framework, equicontinuity can be interpreted as placing “a bound on the
diversity of payoffs” (see Khan, Rath and Sun [3]).
For any ε > 0 and m,n ∈ N, we say that a game Gn satisfies condition
P (ε,m, n) if for any Nash equilibrium x∗ of Gn there exists an ε−equilibrium
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x∗∗ of Gn satisfying |Ut(x∗)− Ut(x∗∗)| < ε for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n} and at least
n − m players use a pure strategy. We interpret this condition as saying
that all Nash equilibrium can be approximately purified: both the gains
from deviations and the number of player not playing a pure strategy can be
made small.
Theorem 1 Let K be an equicontinuous subset of U . Then, for all ε > 0
and all m ∈ N there exists N ∈ N such that n ≥ N and Gn ⊆ K implies that
Gn satisfies condition P (ε,m, n).
This theorem can be proven using Rashid [5]’s elegant proof, after we use
the equicontinuity of K to find δ > 0 such that |V (x)−V (y)| < ε/2 whenever
||x− y|| < δ, x, y ∈ sm and V ∈ K. Only then can Rashid’s observation (1)
be used to show that |Ut(x∗)−Ut(x∗∗)| < ε and to show that if x∗∗ is a Nash
equilibrium in the game G = (Vtk)t,k then x
∗∗ is an ε−equilibrium in the
game where players payoff functions are Ut(x1, . . . , xn) = xt1Vt1
(∑n
j=1
xj
n
)
+
. . .+ xtmVtm
(∑n
j=1
xj
n
)
, for all (x1, . . . , xn).
The importance of the equicontinuity assumption for the above result is
illustrated by the following example. The example shows that without it,
the above theorem is false.
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We will show that there exists an ε > 0 and m ∈ N such that for all
N ∈ N there exists a game Gn with n ≥ N in which condition P (ε,m, n)
does not hold. We let ε = 1 and m = 2 (i.e., there are two actions).
Let N ∈ N be given. Define n = N + 10 and Gn as follows:
Vt1
(∑
j 6=t
xj1
n
)
= α
n
n− 1
∑
j 6=t
xj1
n
and
Vt2
(∑
j 6=t
xj1
n
)
= α
(
1− n
n− 1
∑
j 6=t
xj1
n
)
.
(3)
for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n and where α > n.
We claim that not all equilibria of Gn can be approximately purified.
Define x∗t1 = 1/2 for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n; clearly, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of Gn.
We will show that if x∗∗ is a strategy in Gn satisfying |Ut(x∗)− Ut(x∗∗)| < 1
for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n} and at least n− 2 players use a pure strategy, then x∗∗
is not an 1−equilibrium. Clearly, this will establish our claim.
Note first that there is a player t with x∗∗t1 = 1. We prove this claim by con-
tradiction: suppose that there is no player t satisfying x∗∗t1 = 1. Then consider
a player i such that x∗∗i1 = 0 (since n−2 > 0 players play pure strategies, such
i exists). We have that Ui(x
∗) = α/2 and Ui(x∗∗) = α
(
1− n
n−1
∑
j 6=i
x∗∗j1
n
)
.
Thus, ∣∣∣∣∣α
(
1− n
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
x∗∗j1
n
)
− α
2
∣∣∣∣∣ < 1, (4)
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which implies that ∣∣∣∣∣∑
j 6=i
x∗∗j1
n− 1 −
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣ < 1α < 110 . (5)
This in turn implies that
∑
j 6=i
x∗∗j1
n− 1 >
1
2
− 1
10
=
4
10
. (6)
On the other hand, since n− 2 players play x∗∗j1 = 0, we obtain
∑
j 6=i
x∗∗j1
n− 1 ≤
2
n− 1 =
2
N + 9
≤ 2
10
, (7)
which is a contradiction.
Similarly, we can show that at least one player t˜ plays x∗∗
t˜1
= 0. If t is
such that x∗∗t1 = 1, we obtain that
∑
j 6=t˜
x∗∗j1
n− 1 −
∑
j 6=t
x∗∗j1
n− 1 =
x∗∗t1
n− 1 −
x∗∗
t˜1
n− 1 =
1
n− 1 . (8)
Thus, if t˜ is optimizing by choosing x∗∗
t˜1
= 0, then it must be that
∑
j 6=t˜
x∗∗j1
n−1 ≤
1
2
, which in turn implies that
∑
j 6=t
x∗∗j1
n−1 <
1
2
and so that player t is not
optimizing. Similarly, if player t is optimizing, then player t˜ is not. Also, we
can choose one of them, denoted t¯, such that t¯ is not optimizing and∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j 6=t¯
x∗∗j1
n− 1 −
1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ 12(n− 1) . (9)
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For concreteness, say that t¯ = t (the remaining case is precisely analogous).
Then, it follows that
1− 2
∑
j 6=t
x∗∗j1
n− 1 ≥
1
n− 1 . (10)
This will be used to show that x∗∗ is not an 1−equilibrium, which will com-
plete our example.
We have then that Ut(x
∗∗) = α
∑
j 6=t
x∗∗j1
n−1 , while if he where to choose
xt1 = 0, he would get α
(
1−∑j 6=t x∗∗j1n−1). The difference of payoffs is
α
(
1−
∑
j 6=t
x∗∗j1
n− 1
)
− α
∑
j 6=t
x∗∗j1
n− 1 = α
(
1− 2
∑
j 6=t
x∗∗j1
n− 1
)
≥ α
n− 1 > 1.
(11)
Hence, x∗∗ is not an 1−equilibrium.
We conclude with a remark on our example. The modulus of continuity
ω(δ) of Vtk is
nδ
(n−1)α >
n2δ
n−1 . This number converges to infinity with n, which
shows that the family of payoff functions we used in the example is not
equicontinuous. This account for the failure of the conclusion of Theorem 1.
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